About
How to read a game.
Game theory studies choices whose consequences depend on what others do. Start with the players, their available actions, and what they know when they choose.
The scope
The atlas uses canonical games as reference points. Game families cover models with a shared structure. Mechanisms change how choices are made, strategies describe a player’s plan, and solution concepts help analyze outcomes.
The everyday situations are illustrative. To apply a model, check its assumptions against the actual incentives, timing, information, and opportunities to meet again.
Glossary
- Player
- A participant whose choices affect the outcome. A team or a firm can be a player if the model treats it as one decision maker.
- Action and strategy
- An action is a move at a particular point. A strategy is a full plan for how a player acts at every point they might face.
- Payoff
- A number representing how much a player values an outcome. In a two-player matrix, each cell lists Player A’s payoff first and Player B’s second.
- Best response
- A strategy that gives a player the highest payoff given the other players’ strategies.
- Nash equilibrium
- A profile of strategies where no player can gain by changing their own strategy alone.
- Mixed strategy
- A plan that randomly selects among pure strategies using specified probabilities.
- Backward induction
- Solve a finite game of perfect information from its last decision, then use that result to evaluate earlier decisions.
Further reading
- Martin J. Osborne · Nash equilibrium
- MIT OpenCourseWare · Economic Applications of Game Theory
- MIT OpenCourseWare · Game Theory for Strategic Advantage
- MIT OpenCourseWare · Game Theory
- Andreas Diekmann · Volunteer’s Dilemma
- Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe · Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History
- Axelrod and Hamilton · The Evolution of Cooperation
- Ariel Rubinstein · Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- MIT OpenCourseWare · Game Theory for Managers
- John Nash · The Bargaining Problem
- Robert Rosenthal · Games of Perfect Information, Predatory Pricing and the Chain-Store Paradox
- Elinor Ostrom · Beyond Markets and States
- Maynard Smith and Price · The Logic of Animal Conflict
- Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil · Tacit Coordination Games
- John Maynard Smith · The Theory of Games and the Evolution of Animal Conflicts
- MIT OpenCourseWare · Signaling Games
- Baye, Kovenock and de Vries · The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information
- Güth, Schmittberger and Schwarze · An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining
- Rosemarie Nagel · Unraveling in Guessing Games