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Game

Entry Deterrence

A threat can deter entry only if the entrant expects the incumbent to carry it out.

The model

An entrant first chooses Enter or Stay out. Staying out pays entrant and incumbent (0, 5). After entry, the incumbent can Fight for (−1, 0) or Accommodate for (2, 3).

What the model predicts

After entry the incumbent prefers Accommodate because 3 beats 0. Anticipating that, the entrant chooses Enter because 2 beats 0. This is the subgame-perfect outcome.

Play through the model

Choose a move for Player A.

Try it

Entry has already happened. Which response maximizes the incumbent’s payoff?
Explore the interactive model

Everyday situations

  • A retailer warns a newcomer that it will cut prices if the newcomer opens nearby.
  • An incumbent carrier threatens extra flights if a rival begins serving its route.
  • A software provider threatens steep discounts if a competitor enters its niche.
  • A club threatens to add a competing event if another organizer launches one.
  • A distributor signals it will litigate if a new supplier enters its territory.

What changes the result

  • A prior investment can make fighting cheaper and change what the incumbent would do after entry.
  • An entrant who is unsure of the incumbent’s costs may still take a threat seriously.

Practical insight

Check whether a promised response will still serve the player who made it after the triggering action occurs.

Further reading

More in commitment