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Game family

Alternating-Offers Bargaining

When offers alternate and delay erodes value, patience influences the split.

The model

A and B alternate offers over one unit of surplus until someone accepts. A goes first. Both discount next round’s payoff by the same factor δ, strictly between 0 and 1.

What the model predicts

In the Rubinstein model, agreement is immediate. The first proposer receives 1/(1 + δ) and the responder receives δ/(1 + δ). The responder is offered the discounted value of becoming next round’s proposer.

Play through the model

Adjust the players’ common discount factor. The more both value the next round, the more A must offer B today.

First proposer’s share (%)
66.67
Responder’s share (%)
33.33

Try it

Both players have δ = 0.5. What share goes to the first proposer?
Explore the interactive model

Everyday situations

  • A landlord and tenant exchange proposals while an empty apartment loses rent.
  • A buyer and seller counter each week while stock depreciates.
  • A union and employer take turns proposing terms during a costly stoppage.
  • Two project partners negotiate a split while a market window closes.
  • A venue and an organizer alternate offers while other booking dates disappear.

What changes the result

  • If the players have different discount factors, the more patient side generally secures more, holding the protocol fixed.
  • A finite deadline and its terminal payoff can change the split via backward induction.

Practical insight

Model what delay costs each side and who can make the next credible offer.

Further reading

More in bargaining