Game
Ultimatum Game
One player proposes a split, and the other can reject it at a cost to both.
The model
A proposes how to divide 10 indivisible tokens. B can accept the proposal or reject it, leaving both with 0. Assume B accepts every positive offer and rejects an offer of zero.
What the model predicts
Given this response rule, A offers 1 and keeps 9. If B accepts zero when indifferent, keeping all 10 is also supportable under money-only preferences. Fairness preferences can make rejection of a positive offer worthwhile to B.
Play through the model
Split 10 tokens. B accepts offers at or above their minimum and rejects the rest.
- Response
- Accept
- Player A payoff
- 9
- Player B payoff
- 1
Try it
Everyday situations
- A buyer makes a final offer on a used item with no time left for a counteroffer.
- A lead proposes a fixed bonus split that a collaborator can veto.
- A publisher offers a final royalty split for a deal that expires that day.
- A candidate chooses whether to accept a single fixed salary offer.
- Two organizers can take a sponsor’s last proposed revenue split or cancel the event.
What changes the result
- Allowing a counteroffer gives B a continuation value and changes the proposal problem.
- A credible minimum acceptable share changes the offer A can expect to get accepted.
Practical insight
The power to reject matters when the proposer believes the responder will actually use it.