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Game

Ultimatum Game

One player proposes a split, and the other can reject it at a cost to both.

The model

A proposes how to divide 10 indivisible tokens. B can accept the proposal or reject it, leaving both with 0. Assume B accepts every positive offer and rejects an offer of zero.

What the model predicts

Given this response rule, A offers 1 and keeps 9. If B accepts zero when indifferent, keeping all 10 is also supportable under money-only preferences. Fairness preferences can make rejection of a positive offer worthwhile to B.

Play through the model

Split 10 tokens. B accepts offers at or above their minimum and rejects the rest.

Response
Accept
Player A payoff
9
Player B payoff
1

Try it

B rejects zero and accepts any positive number of tokens. What is the smallest accepted offer?
Explore the interactive model

Everyday situations

  • A buyer makes a final offer on a used item with no time left for a counteroffer.
  • A lead proposes a fixed bonus split that a collaborator can veto.
  • A publisher offers a final royalty split for a deal that expires that day.
  • A candidate chooses whether to accept a single fixed salary offer.
  • Two organizers can take a sponsor’s last proposed revenue split or cancel the event.

What changes the result

  • Allowing a counteroffer gives B a continuation value and changes the proposal problem.
  • A credible minimum acceptable share changes the offer A can expect to get accepted.

Practical insight

The power to reject matters when the proposer believes the responder will actually use it.

Further reading

More in bargaining