Game
Centipede Game
Passing can grow a shared reward, but the last chance to take can unravel cooperation.
The model
A can take (2, 0) or pass to B. B can take (1, 3) or pass to A. A then chooses between taking (4, 2) and passing to the final outcome (3, 5).
What the model predicts
At the last decision A takes 4 over 3. Anticipating this, B takes 3 over 2. Anticipating B, A takes 2 over 1 at the opening. This is backward induction under the stated preferences and known stopping point.
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Everyday situations
- Two cofounders take turns extending a joint pilot or cashing out their current share.
- Two project teams alternate investments in a tool that either can take over when its turn comes.
- Two collaborators take turns adding to a portfolio before one chooses to sell it.
- Two vendors alternate expanding a joint demonstration before one claims the current contract.
- Two players take turns adding to a pot that can be claimed at any turn.
What changes the result
- A later or uncertain stopping point changes what each player can infer from the end of the game.
- If A values B’s gain enough at the final node, the backward-induction choices can change.
Practical insight
Before giving up a sure reward to grow a joint opportunity, examine the incentives at the next handoff and at the last one.