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Game

Centipede Game

Passing can grow a shared reward, but the last chance to take can unravel cooperation.

The model

A can take (2, 0) or pass to B. B can take (1, 3) or pass to A. A then chooses between taking (4, 2) and passing to the final outcome (3, 5).

What the model predicts

At the last decision A takes 4 over 3. Anticipating this, B takes 3 over 2. Anticipating B, A takes 2 over 1 at the opening. This is backward induction under the stated preferences and known stopping point.

Play through the model

Choose a move for Player A.

Try it

At the final decision, which outcome does A choose when maximizing only A’s payoff?
Explore the interactive model

Everyday situations

  • Two cofounders take turns extending a joint pilot or cashing out their current share.
  • Two project teams alternate investments in a tool that either can take over when its turn comes.
  • Two collaborators take turns adding to a portfolio before one chooses to sell it.
  • Two vendors alternate expanding a joint demonstration before one claims the current contract.
  • Two players take turns adding to a pot that can be claimed at any turn.

What changes the result

  • A later or uncertain stopping point changes what each player can infer from the end of the game.
  • If A values B’s gain enough at the final node, the backward-induction choices can change.

Practical insight

Before giving up a sure reward to grow a joint opportunity, examine the incentives at the next handoff and at the last one.

Further reading

More in cooperation