Game family
Repeated Games
When the same game recurs, players can make future choices depend on what happens now.
The model
Repeat the Prisoner’s Dilemma with payoffs 3 for mutual cooperation, 5 for a lone defection, and 1 for mutual defection. Each player uses grim trigger, cooperating until someone defects and then defecting forever. Future payoffs are discounted by δ each round.
What the model predicts
Cooperating forever yields 3/(1 − δ). A one-time deviation yields 5 + δ/(1 − δ). With perfect observation, grim trigger supports cooperation as a subgame-perfect equilibrium when δ ≥ 1/2.
Play through the model
Compare cooperating forever with defecting once against grim trigger. Change how much each future round is worth.
- Cooperate forever
- 6
- Defect once
- 6
- Grim trigger sustains cooperation
- Yes
Try it
Everyday situations
- A supplier chooses quality each month and a buyer can respond by switching orders.
- Two neighbors trade help repeatedly over a long tenancy.
- Two merchants decide weekly whether to honor an informal price arrangement.
- A team allocates future support based on whether partners met earlier commitments.
- Two regions review shared water withdrawals each season and respond to overruns.
What changes the result
- In a known finite repetition of this game with a unique stage equilibrium, backward induction yields defection in each round.
- With noisy monitoring, a permanent punishment can destroy cooperation after a mistake.
Practical insight
A relationship sustains cooperation when players can observe departures and care enough about future dealings.