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Game family

Repeated Games

When the same game recurs, players can make future choices depend on what happens now.

The model

Repeat the Prisoner’s Dilemma with payoffs 3 for mutual cooperation, 5 for a lone defection, and 1 for mutual defection. Each player uses grim trigger, cooperating until someone defects and then defecting forever. Future payoffs are discounted by δ each round.

What the model predicts

Cooperating forever yields 3/(1 − δ). A one-time deviation yields 5 + δ/(1 − δ). With perfect observation, grim trigger supports cooperation as a subgame-perfect equilibrium when δ ≥ 1/2.

Play through the model

Compare cooperating forever with defecting once against grim trigger. Change how much each future round is worth.

Cooperate forever
6
Defect once
6
Grim trigger sustains cooperation
Yes

Try it

Can grim trigger sustain cooperation in this example when δ = 0.3?
Explore the interactive model

Everyday situations

  • A supplier chooses quality each month and a buyer can respond by switching orders.
  • Two neighbors trade help repeatedly over a long tenancy.
  • Two merchants decide weekly whether to honor an informal price arrangement.
  • A team allocates future support based on whether partners met earlier commitments.
  • Two regions review shared water withdrawals each season and respond to overruns.

What changes the result

  • In a known finite repetition of this game with a unique stage equilibrium, backward induction yields defection in each round.
  • With noisy monitoring, a permanent punishment can destroy cooperation after a mistake.

Practical insight

A relationship sustains cooperation when players can observe departures and care enough about future dealings.

Further reading

More in trust