Strategy
Tit for Tat
Start by cooperating, then copy the other player’s previous move.
The model
In a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, Tit for Tat starts with Cooperate. In each subsequent round it repeats the opponent’s last observed action.
What the model predicts
Two copies cooperate throughout if moves are observed accurately and executed as intended. After a single accidental defection, two strict copies can alternate defection indefinitely unless something interrupts the cycle.
Play through the model
Both players use Tit for Tat. Set a round when A accidentally defects. Zero means no mistake.
- A’s move this round
- Defect
- B’s move this round
- Cooperate
- A’s total payoff
- 13
- B’s total payoff
- 8
Try it
Everyday situations
- Two support teams mirror the responsiveness they received in the preceding handoff.
- Two neighbors share equipment after the other returned it on time last time.
- A supplier offers flexibility after its customer did the same on the previous order.
- Two colleagues respond to a missed favor by withholding their next one.
- Two groups match each other’s previous effort on successive joint events.
What changes the result
- Generous Tit for Tat sometimes cooperates after observing a defection.
- Win–stay, lose–shift reacts to whether the previous outcome was satisfactory.
Practical insight
Build a route back to cooperation when a bad outcome might have come from noise or a mistake.