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Strategy

Tit for Tat

Start by cooperating, then copy the other player’s previous move.

The model

In a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, Tit for Tat starts with Cooperate. In each subsequent round it repeats the opponent’s last observed action.

What the model predicts

Two copies cooperate throughout if moves are observed accurately and executed as intended. After a single accidental defection, two strict copies can alternate defection indefinitely unless something interrupts the cycle.

Play through the model

Both players use Tit for Tat. Set a round when A accidentally defects. Zero means no mistake.

A’s move this round
Defect
B’s move this round
Cooperate
A’s total payoff
13
B’s total payoff
8

Try it

Your opponent defected last round. What does strict Tit for Tat play this round?
Explore the interactive model

Everyday situations

  • Two support teams mirror the responsiveness they received in the preceding handoff.
  • Two neighbors share equipment after the other returned it on time last time.
  • A supplier offers flexibility after its customer did the same on the previous order.
  • Two colleagues respond to a missed favor by withholding their next one.
  • Two groups match each other’s previous effort on successive joint events.

What changes the result

  • Generous Tit for Tat sometimes cooperates after observing a defection.
  • Win–stay, lose–shift reacts to whether the previous outcome was satisfactory.

Practical insight

Build a route back to cooperation when a bad outcome might have come from noise or a mistake.

Further reading

More in trust