Game
Volunteer’s Dilemma
One volunteer is enough, so each person hopes somebody else will go first.
The model
Each player receives a benefit of 5 if anyone volunteers. Volunteering costs 2 to the person doing it. If everybody waits, everyone gets 0.
What the model predicts
Any outcome with exactly one volunteer is a pure Nash equilibrium. That player would lose 3 by backing out, while another volunteer would incur a needless cost of 2.
| Volunteer | Wait | |
|---|---|---|
| Volunteer | ||
| Wait |
Try it
Everyday situations
- One attendee needs to share meeting notes, and everyone would prefer to read them.
- One resident needs to call the building manager about an outage.
- One traveler in the group must ask staff which platform to use.
- One engineer needs to cover a weekend alert so the team can meet its service target.
- One parent must book the team’s field before the remaining slot disappears.
What changes the result
- If volunteering becomes cheap, people are more willing to act without assurance from others.
- A rota can designate one volunteer before a need arises.
Practical insight
An explicit assignment can solve a coverage problem when everyone is waiting for someone else to act.
Further reading
More in collective action
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Tragedy of the Commons
Each user captures the benefit of taking more from a shared resource and bears only part of the damage.