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Game

Volunteer’s Dilemma

One volunteer is enough, so each person hopes somebody else will go first.

The model

Each player receives a benefit of 5 if anyone volunteers. Volunteering costs 2 to the person doing it. If everybody waits, everyone gets 0.

What the model predicts

Any outcome with exactly one volunteer is a pure Nash equilibrium. That player would lose 3 by backing out, while another volunteer would incur a needless cost of 2.

Player A chooses a row. Player B chooses a column. Select an outcome to compare their incentives.
VolunteerWait
Volunteer
Wait

Try it

Nobody else is going to volunteer. What maximizes your payoff?
Explore the interactive model

Everyday situations

  • One attendee needs to share meeting notes, and everyone would prefer to read them.
  • One resident needs to call the building manager about an outage.
  • One traveler in the group must ask staff which platform to use.
  • One engineer needs to cover a weekend alert so the team can meet its service target.
  • One parent must book the team’s field before the remaining slot disappears.

What changes the result

  • If volunteering becomes cheap, people are more willing to act without assurance from others.
  • A rota can designate one volunteer before a need arises.

Practical insight

An explicit assignment can solve a coverage problem when everyone is waiting for someone else to act.

Further reading

More in collective action