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Game family

All-Pay Contest

Everyone pays for their effort, while only the winner gets the prize.

The model

Two risk-neutral players value a prize at 10. Each submits a bid. The highest bid wins and both players pay their own bid, with ties sharing the prize.

What the model predicts

A symmetric mixed equilibrium has each bid uniformly on [0, 10]. A bid b in that range wins with probability b/10 and costs b regardless, so its expected payoff is zero.

Play through the model

Both players value the prize at 10. Both pay their bids, and a tie splits the prize.

Player A payoff
-4
Player B payoff
4

Try it

You bid 4 and your opponent bids 6. What is your net payoff?
Explore the interactive model

Everyday situations

  • Teams build prototypes for a single award and all bear their development costs.
  • Candidates invest time campaigning for one elected role.
  • Companies incur expenses preparing proposals for one exclusive contract.
  • Rivals spend on research in a winner-take-all patent race.
  • Departments prepare competing pitches for a single budget allocation.

What changes the result

  • A cap can prevent large expenditures and change equilibrium bidding.
  • When preparation can be reused, the losing effort has residual value and the all-pay model needs different payoffs.

Practical insight

Include the cost of the losing attempts when judging what the contest consumes.

Further reading

More in competition