Game family
All-Pay Contest
Everyone pays for their effort, while only the winner gets the prize.
The model
Two risk-neutral players value a prize at 10. Each submits a bid. The highest bid wins and both players pay their own bid, with ties sharing the prize.
What the model predicts
A symmetric mixed equilibrium has each bid uniformly on [0, 10]. A bid b in that range wins with probability b/10 and costs b regardless, so its expected payoff is zero.
Play through the model
Both players value the prize at 10. Both pay their bids, and a tie splits the prize.
- Player A payoff
- -4
- Player B payoff
- 4
Try it
Everyday situations
- Teams build prototypes for a single award and all bear their development costs.
- Candidates invest time campaigning for one elected role.
- Companies incur expenses preparing proposals for one exclusive contract.
- Rivals spend on research in a winner-take-all patent race.
- Departments prepare competing pitches for a single budget allocation.
What changes the result
- A cap can prevent large expenditures and change equilibrium bidding.
- When preparation can be reused, the losing effort has residual value and the all-pay model needs different payoffs.
Practical insight
Include the cost of the losing attempts when judging what the contest consumes.
Further reading
More in competition
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Bertrand Competition
When identical sellers compete on price, a tiny undercut can capture the entire market.
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First-Price Auction
The highest bid wins and the winner pays their own bid.
Competition · Game family
Second-Price Auction
The highest bidder wins and pays the highest competing bid.