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Game family

Second-Price Auction

The highest bidder wins and pays the highest competing bid.

The model

Bidders privately value one item and submit sealed bids. The highest bidder wins and pays the second-highest bid. Losing bidders pay zero.

What the model predicts

Bidding your private value is weakly dominant under the stated rules. When the highest competing bid is below your value, you want to win at that price. When it is above your value, you want to lose.

Play through the model

A values the item at 80 and B at 55. The winner pays the lower bid. Payoffs on a tie are expected values.

Winner
Player B
Price
40
Player A payoff
0
Player B payoff
15

Try it

You value the item at 80 and the highest competing bid is 55. If you bid 80, what do you pay?
Explore the interactive model

Everyday situations

  • An art fundraiser runs a sealed auction that charges the highest losing bid.
  • A proxy bidding platform advances the displayed price based on competing maximum bids.
  • An auction allocates one ad slot and charges the winning bidder the next bid.
  • A school sells a surplus instrument through a published second-price rule.
  • A club sells a single premium seat and uses the runner-up’s bid as the price.

What changes the result

  • A reserve price sets a floor on what the winner pays.
  • The private-value argument can fail if other bids reveal information about the item’s value to you.

Practical insight

Separate the bid that determines whether you win from the rule that sets what you pay.

Further reading

More in competition