Game family
Second-Price Auction
The highest bidder wins and pays the highest competing bid.
The model
Bidders privately value one item and submit sealed bids. The highest bidder wins and pays the second-highest bid. Losing bidders pay zero.
What the model predicts
Bidding your private value is weakly dominant under the stated rules. When the highest competing bid is below your value, you want to win at that price. When it is above your value, you want to lose.
Play through the model
A values the item at 80 and B at 55. The winner pays the lower bid. Payoffs on a tie are expected values.
- Winner
- Player B
- Price
- 40
- Player A payoff
- 0
- Player B payoff
- 15
Try it
Everyday situations
- An art fundraiser runs a sealed auction that charges the highest losing bid.
- A proxy bidding platform advances the displayed price based on competing maximum bids.
- An auction allocates one ad slot and charges the winning bidder the next bid.
- A school sells a surplus instrument through a published second-price rule.
- A club sells a single premium seat and uses the runner-up’s bid as the price.
What changes the result
- A reserve price sets a floor on what the winner pays.
- The private-value argument can fail if other bids reveal information about the item’s value to you.
Practical insight
Separate the bid that determines whether you win from the rule that sets what you pay.
Further reading
More in competition
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Bertrand Competition
When identical sellers compete on price, a tiny undercut can capture the entire market.
Competition · Game family
First-Price Auction
The highest bid wins and the winner pays their own bid.