Game family
First-Price Auction
The highest bid wins and the winner pays their own bid.
The model
Two risk-neutral bidders have independent private values uniform on [0, 100]. They submit sealed bids simultaneously. The highest bidder wins and pays their bid.
What the model predicts
In the symmetric equilibrium each bidder bids half their value. If the opponent follows that rule, bidding b between 0 and 50 wins with probability b/50 and gives expected surplus (v − b) × b/50, maximized at b = v/2.
Play through the model
A values the item at 60 and B at 80. The winner pays their own bid. Payoffs on a tie are expected values.
- Winner
- Player B
- Price
- 60
- Player A payoff
- 0
- Player B payoff
- 20
Try it
Everyday situations
- Collectors submit sealed offers on a piece and the winning collector pays their offer.
- Developers submit private bids on a land parcel with different plans for its use.
- Advertisers bid for one impression under a first-price auction rule.
- Two buyers give a seller confidential best-and-final offers.
- Companies submit sealed bids for a license sold to the highest bidder.
What changes the result
- With more symmetric bidders in the same uniform-value model, equilibrium bids move closer to value.
- With common-value uncertainty, winning itself can convey bad news about how optimistic your estimate was.
Practical insight
A higher bid raises the chance of winning and reduces surplus conditional on winning. Estimate both effects.
Further reading
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The highest bidder wins and pays the highest competing bid.