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Game

Hawk–Dove

Aggression pays against restraint and becomes costly when opponents also escalate.

The model

Two animals contest a resource worth 4. Two Doves split it. A Hawk takes all against a Dove. Two Hawks fight, with expected payoff (4 − 8) ÷ 2 = −2 each.

What the model predicts

The game has two asymmetric pure equilibria. In the symmetric mixed equilibrium, each plays Hawk with probability 4/8 = 1/2. At that frequency Hawk and Dove have the same expected payoff.

Player A chooses a row. Player B chooses a column. Select an outcome to compare their incentives.
HawkDove
Hawk
Dove

Try it

If injury cost rises from 8 to 16, what is the symmetric equilibrium probability of Hawk?
Explore the interactive model

Everyday situations

  • Animals contest a feeding site that can be shared if neither escalates.
  • Two firms seek an exclusive placement and each can litigate or share access.
  • Two groups contest a desirable room and can split time if neither insists on exclusive use.
  • Two distributors seek the same territory and face losses if both fight for exclusivity.
  • Two teams can share a budget or incur political costs fighting over the full amount.

What changes the result

  • As injury cost rises above the resource value, the symmetric equilibrium frequency of Hawk falls.
  • An observable owner–intruder convention can assign the aggressive role according to a feature both can see.

Practical insight

The return to an aggressive strategy depends on how often it encounters aggression.

Further reading

More in conflict