Game
Hawk–Dove
Aggression pays against restraint and becomes costly when opponents also escalate.
The model
Two animals contest a resource worth 4. Two Doves split it. A Hawk takes all against a Dove. Two Hawks fight, with expected payoff (4 − 8) ÷ 2 = −2 each.
What the model predicts
The game has two asymmetric pure equilibria. In the symmetric mixed equilibrium, each plays Hawk with probability 4/8 = 1/2. At that frequency Hawk and Dove have the same expected payoff.
| Hawk | Dove | |
|---|---|---|
| Hawk | ||
| Dove |
Try it
Everyday situations
- Animals contest a feeding site that can be shared if neither escalates.
- Two firms seek an exclusive placement and each can litigate or share access.
- Two groups contest a desirable room and can split time if neither insists on exclusive use.
- Two distributors seek the same territory and face losses if both fight for exclusivity.
- Two teams can share a budget or incur political costs fighting over the full amount.
What changes the result
- As injury cost rises above the resource value, the symmetric equilibrium frequency of Hawk falls.
- An observable owner–intruder convention can assign the aggressive role according to a feature both can see.
Practical insight
The return to an aggressive strategy depends on how often it encounters aggression.
Further reading
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