Skip to content

Game family

War of Attrition

Players pay to stay in a contest, and the last one to concede wins.

The model

Two players privately choose when to quit. The first quitter ends the contest, and the remaining player wins a prize worth 10. Each pays 1 per unit of elapsed time until the contest ends. A tie splits the prize.

What the model predicts

Waiting one more unit costs 1 while the contest continues. Its value comes from the chance the rival quits during that interval. If the rival certainly quits at time 3, committing to wait past 3 earns 7.

Play through the model

Choose when each player will quit. Waiting costs one per time unit until either player quits.

Elapsed time
3
Player A payoff
7
Player B payoff
-3

Try it

Your opponent will quit at time 3. What is your payoff if you commit to quit at time 5?
Explore the interactive model

Everyday situations

  • Two shops subsidize discounts until one stops the promotion.
  • Two firms keep pursuing a costly exclusive contract until one drops out.
  • Two parties bear legal expenses while waiting for the other to concede.
  • Two animals sustain a costly display until one abandons the territory.
  • Two negotiators endure losses during a stoppage while waiting for the other to yield.

What changes the result

  • Different costs of delay give players different capacities to wait.
  • Private information about the value of winning makes persistence informative.

Practical insight

Use the remaining prize and the expected cost of continuing to decide whether to wait. Past waiting costs are sunk.

Further reading

More in conflict