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Game

Matching Pennies

One player wants a match and the other wants a mismatch, so predictable choices are exploitable.

The model

Both players secretly choose Heads or Tails. A wins 1 from B if their choices match. B wins 1 from A if they differ.

What the model predicts

No pure action pair is stable. The losing player always wants to switch. The unique Nash equilibrium has each independently selecting Heads half the time.

Player A chooses a row. Player B chooses a column. Select an outcome to compare their incentives.
HeadsTails
Heads
Tails

Try it

B chooses Heads 80% of the time. Which pure strategy gives A the higher expected payoff?
Explore the interactive model

Everyday situations

  • A keeper wants to dive toward a penalty kick while the kicker wants the opposite side.
  • A sender chooses one of two routes while an interceptor tries to pick the same route.
  • A server tries to surprise a receiver who guesses the direction before the serve.
  • A security team varies patrol routes while a trespasser tries to avoid the patrol.
  • A batter anticipates a pitch location while a pitcher tries to upset that prediction.

What changes the result

  • Unequal rewards can shift the equilibrium mixing probabilities.
  • A player who sees the other’s realized move before acting can choose a winning response.

Practical insight

In an adversarial setting, examine whether your opponent can exploit the pattern in your choices.

Further reading

More in conflict