Game
Battle of the Sexes
Players want to coordinate, but each favors a different outcome.
The model
Two friends choose Concert or Match independently. Both would rather go together than separately. A prefers the concert, which pays (2, 1) if both go. B prefers the match, which pays (1, 2). A mismatch pays (0, 0).
What the model predicts
Both coordinated outcomes are pure Nash equilibria. A prefers one equilibrium and B prefers the other. There is also a mixed equilibrium with A choosing Concert with probability 2/3 and B with probability 1/3.
| Concert | Match | |
|---|---|---|
| Concert | ||
| Match |
Try it
Everyday situations
- Friends want a shared evening and have different first choices for the event.
- Two teams want a common editor and each already knows a different one.
- Two shops want joint opening hours but draw their peak crowds at different times.
- Band members want to rehearse together but favor different rehearsal rooms.
- Two departments need a joint review and prefer different meeting times.
What changes the result
- A coin toss or alternation can distribute the preferred outcomes over time.
- A publicly observed binding first move can let one player select the meeting place.
Practical insight
Agree on a selection rule when both sides want alignment but disagree about which choice to align on.
Further reading
More in coordination
Coordination · Game family
Minimum-Effort Game
The least prepared player sets the group’s output, while extra preparation has a private cost.
Coordination · Game family
Pure Coordination
Players want compatible choices and are indifferent between the successful matches in the simplest model.
Coordination · Game
Stag Hunt
Joint effort offers the best reward, but it pays only if others commit too.