Game family
Minimum-Effort Game
The least prepared player sets the group’s output, while extra preparation has a private cost.
The model
Each of three players picks effort 1, 2, or 3. Each earns twice the group’s minimum effort minus their own effort.
What the model predicts
Every common effort level is a pure Nash equilibrium. Effort above the minimum only adds cost. A player at the minimum loses more output than they save by cutting effort.
Play through the model
Change each player’s effort. The lowest effort sets output for everyone.
- Group minimum
- 2
- Player A payoff
- 2
- Player B payoff
- 2
- Player C payoff
- 2
Try it
Everyday situations
- A launch waits until the least ready dependency has passed its checks.
- A relay team can only complete the routine its least prepared member knows.
- A joint dataset can cover only the time span available from every partner.
- A convoy travels at the speed of the slowest vehicle.
- A cross-office service guarantees the hours that every required team covers.
What changes the result
- A shared minimum standard can remove low-effort outcomes from the feasible choices.
- Visible milestones can change beliefs about how much preparation others will complete.
Practical insight
Identify which input caps the group’s performance before rewarding effort elsewhere.
Further reading
More in coordination
Coordination · Game
Battle of the Sexes
Players want to coordinate, but each favors a different outcome.
Coordination · Game family
Pure Coordination
Players want compatible choices and are indifferent between the successful matches in the simplest model.
Coordination · Game
Stag Hunt
Joint effort offers the best reward, but it pays only if others commit too.