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Game

Stag Hunt

Joint effort offers the best reward, but it pays only if others commit too.

The model

Each hunter chooses Stag or Hare. A stag hunt pays 4 to each hunter if both join. A lone stag hunter earns 0. Hunting hare earns 3 regardless of the other hunter’s choice.

What the model predicts

Both Stag and both Hare are pure Nash equilibria. Stag is a strict best response if you believe the other chooses Stag with probability greater than 3/4.

Player A chooses a row. Player B chooses a column. Select an outcome to compare their incentives.
StagHare
Stag
Hare

Try it

You think there is a 60% chance the other player chooses Stag. Which action pays more in expectation?
Explore the interactive model

Everyday situations

  • Two teams switch to a better shared tool only if both agree to migrate.
  • Two colleagues plan a joint presentation, while each can safely present alone.
  • Two distributors share a route if both can guarantee their volumes.
  • Two labs standardize a protocol only if each expects the other’s data to be compatible.
  • Two clubs jointly rent a larger venue if both can commit to filling it.

What changes the result

  • A reliable pledge changes beliefs about the other hunter’s choice.
  • Lowering the fallback payoff or reducing the loss from attempting Stag lowers the threshold for choosing it.

Practical insight

When people already agree on the best outcome, give them evidence that enough others will follow through.

Further reading

More in coordination