Game
Stag Hunt
Joint effort offers the best reward, but it pays only if others commit too.
The model
Each hunter chooses Stag or Hare. A stag hunt pays 4 to each hunter if both join. A lone stag hunter earns 0. Hunting hare earns 3 regardless of the other hunter’s choice.
What the model predicts
Both Stag and both Hare are pure Nash equilibria. Stag is a strict best response if you believe the other chooses Stag with probability greater than 3/4.
| Stag | Hare | |
|---|---|---|
| Stag | ||
| Hare |
Try it
Everyday situations
- Two teams switch to a better shared tool only if both agree to migrate.
- Two colleagues plan a joint presentation, while each can safely present alone.
- Two distributors share a route if both can guarantee their volumes.
- Two labs standardize a protocol only if each expects the other’s data to be compatible.
- Two clubs jointly rent a larger venue if both can commit to filling it.
What changes the result
- A reliable pledge changes beliefs about the other hunter’s choice.
- Lowering the fallback payoff or reducing the loss from attempting Stag lowers the threshold for choosing it.
Practical insight
When people already agree on the best outcome, give them evidence that enough others will follow through.
Further reading
More in coordination
Coordination · Game
Battle of the Sexes
Players want to coordinate, but each favors a different outcome.
Coordination · Game family
Minimum-Effort Game
The least prepared player sets the group’s output, while extra preparation has a private cost.
Coordination · Game family
Pure Coordination
Players want compatible choices and are indifferent between the successful matches in the simplest model.