Game family
Pure Coordination
Players want compatible choices and are indifferent between the successful matches in the simplest model.
The model
Two people independently choose North Gate or South Gate. Each gets 1 if they meet and 0 if they choose different gates.
What the model predicts
Both matches are pure Nash equilibria. The payoff table alone gives no reason to favor one gate. A salient landmark or an established convention can help select a match.
| North Gate | South Gate | |
|---|---|---|
| North Gate | ||
| South Gate |
Try it
Everyday situations
- Friends without phone reception pick a gate where they hope to meet.
- Developers choose the same wire format so two services can communicate.
- Contractors adopt matching units before exchanging measurements.
- Colleagues agree on a single location for a shared file.
- Cyclists in a group use the same hand signal to indicate a stop.
What changes the result
- An asymmetric landmark can create a focal point even if payoffs are identical.
- If players prefer different matches, the game becomes a coordination problem with conflicting preferences.
Practical insight
Make a default easy to identify and make it common knowledge whenever possible.
Further reading
More in coordination
Coordination · Game
Battle of the Sexes
Players want to coordinate, but each favors a different outcome.
Coordination · Game family
Minimum-Effort Game
The least prepared player sets the group’s output, while extra preparation has a private cost.
Coordination · Game
Stag Hunt
Joint effort offers the best reward, but it pays only if others commit too.