Game
Beauty Contest Guessing Game
The best guess depends on what you think others will guess, and what they think everyone else will guess.
The model
Players pick a real number from 0 to 100. The closest to two-thirds of the group average wins, with ties sharing the prize.
What the model predicts
All choosing 0 is the unique Nash equilibrium in the standard version with at least two players. The target lies below the highest permitted guess. Ruling out overly high guesses and repeating the reasoning pushes guesses toward zero. This illustrates how assumptions about other players’ reasoning can shape your own choice.
Play through the model
Enter three guesses. The player closest to two-thirds of their average wins.
- Target
- 20
- Winner
- Player A
Try it
Everyday situations
- Survey participants aim their estimates at a fraction of the average response.
- Analysts anticipate where peers will place their consensus forecast.
- Traders try to infer what other traders expect the market to favor.
- Contestants choose entries aimed at what they think the judging panel expects others to choose.
- A team sets a bid relative to its forecast of competing bids rather than an external benchmark.
What changes the result
- A multiplier of 1 makes every common choice an equilibrium.
- A bounded number of reasoning steps can produce guesses above the equilibrium.
Practical insight
When success depends on others’ expectations, distinguish the equilibrium from the level of reasoning you actually expect in the group.
Further reading
More in information
Information · Game family
Cheap Talk
A costless, nonbinding message can still carry information if the sender wants the receiver to respond appropriately.
Information · Mechanism
Screening
An uninformed player offers options that make informed players reveal their types through choice.
Information · Game family
Signaling Games
An informed player acts first, and the other uses that action to infer what the player knows or is.