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Game

Beauty Contest Guessing Game

The best guess depends on what you think others will guess, and what they think everyone else will guess.

The model

Players pick a real number from 0 to 100. The closest to two-thirds of the group average wins, with ties sharing the prize.

What the model predicts

All choosing 0 is the unique Nash equilibrium in the standard version with at least two players. The target lies below the highest permitted guess. Ruling out overly high guesses and repeating the reasoning pushes guesses toward zero. This illustrates how assumptions about other players’ reasoning can shape your own choice.

Play through the model

Enter three guesses. The player closest to two-thirds of their average wins.

Target
20
Winner
Player A

Try it

You predict the group average will be 30. What target follows from that forecast?
Explore the interactive model

Everyday situations

  • Survey participants aim their estimates at a fraction of the average response.
  • Analysts anticipate where peers will place their consensus forecast.
  • Traders try to infer what other traders expect the market to favor.
  • Contestants choose entries aimed at what they think the judging panel expects others to choose.
  • A team sets a bid relative to its forecast of competing bids rather than an external benchmark.

What changes the result

  • A multiplier of 1 makes every common choice an equilibrium.
  • A bounded number of reasoning steps can produce guesses above the equilibrium.

Practical insight

When success depends on others’ expectations, distinguish the equilibrium from the level of reasoning you actually expect in the group.

Further reading

More in information