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Cheap Talk

A costless, nonbinding message can still carry information if the sender wants the receiver to respond appropriately.

The model

A guide knows which of two trails is safe and can send a costless message. The hiker then picks a trail. Both gain 1 if the hiker reaches safety and 0 otherwise.

What the model predicts

Truthful advice and a hiker who follows it form an equilibrium because neither benefits from a unilateral deviation. An equilibrium that ignores messages is possible too. If the guide always wants the hiker on one trail, full revelation by this message rule fails.

Play through the model

Play both sides. Select the safe trail, the guide’s message, and the hiker’s response.

Hiker’s choice
South
Guide and hiker each earn
1

Try it

The guide only benefits when the hiker reaches safety. Can truthful messages and following them form an equilibrium?
Explore the interactive model

Everyday situations

  • A teammate tells a reviewer which module needs urgent attention.
  • A department forecasts its capacity before another team commits to a deadline.
  • A vendor describes which product suits a buyer and may earn different margins on each.
  • A colleague recommends a restaurant to a group whose preferences they know.
  • A route coordinator tells a driver which road is clear without sending proof.

What changes the result

  • Partially aligned preferences can support coarse messages that reveal only some information.
  • A verifiable report changes what the receiver can establish independently.

Practical insight

Evaluate what the sender gains from the action their message is meant to induce.

Further reading

More in information