Game family
Cheap Talk
A costless, nonbinding message can still carry information if the sender wants the receiver to respond appropriately.
The model
A guide knows which of two trails is safe and can send a costless message. The hiker then picks a trail. Both gain 1 if the hiker reaches safety and 0 otherwise.
What the model predicts
Truthful advice and a hiker who follows it form an equilibrium because neither benefits from a unilateral deviation. An equilibrium that ignores messages is possible too. If the guide always wants the hiker on one trail, full revelation by this message rule fails.
Play through the model
Play both sides. Select the safe trail, the guide’s message, and the hiker’s response.
- Hiker’s choice
- South
- Guide and hiker each earn
- 1
Try it
Everyday situations
- A teammate tells a reviewer which module needs urgent attention.
- A department forecasts its capacity before another team commits to a deadline.
- A vendor describes which product suits a buyer and may earn different margins on each.
- A colleague recommends a restaurant to a group whose preferences they know.
- A route coordinator tells a driver which road is clear without sending proof.
What changes the result
- Partially aligned preferences can support coarse messages that reveal only some information.
- A verifiable report changes what the receiver can establish independently.
Practical insight
Evaluate what the sender gains from the action their message is meant to induce.
Further reading
More in information
Information · Game
Beauty Contest Guessing Game
The best guess depends on what you think others will guess, and what they think everyone else will guess.
Information · Mechanism
Screening
An uninformed player offers options that make informed players reveal their types through choice.
Information · Game family
Signaling Games
An informed player acts first, and the other uses that action to infer what the player knows or is.