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Game family

Signaling Games

An informed player acts first, and the other uses that action to infer what the player knows or is.

The model

A seller privately knows their product quality. A warranty raises the sale price by 3 if buyers infer high quality. Expected warranty cost is 1 for high quality and 5 for low quality.

What the model predicts

The price premium can separate the two types. The high-quality seller gains 2 from offering the warranty, while the low-quality seller would lose 2 by mimicking. Buyers can infer quality if the price premium and these costs hold.

Play through the model

Adjust the price premium buyers pay when they see a warranty. See which seller types gain from offering it.

High-quality seller gain
2
Low-quality seller gain
-2
Warranty incentive
Only the high-quality seller strictly prefers offering it

Try it

The warranty raises the sale price by 3 and costs a low-quality seller 5. Does that seller benefit by mimicking?
Explore the interactive model

Everyday situations

  • A manufacturer offers a long warranty whose expected repair cost depends on reliability.
  • A candidate completes a work sample that is easier for someone with relevant skill.
  • A seller gives buyers a return option that is costly if the product routinely disappoints.
  • A vendor posts a performance bond that is expensive to lose if they miss delivery.
  • A founder invests personal capital to signal confidence in a project’s prospects.

What changes the result

  • If both types can signal cheaply, both may choose the same action in a pooling equilibrium.
  • If warranty terms are unobservable or unenforceable, they may carry little information.

Practical insight

Ask how easy the same action would be for someone without the quality it supposedly signals.

Further reading

More in information