Mechanism
Screening
An uninformed player offers options that make informed players reveal their types through choice.
The model
A seller offers Basic at 3 and Premium at 8. Low-demand buyers value them at 5 and 7. High-demand buyers value them at 6 and 12. Either type can walk away for 0.
What the model predicts
Low-demand buyers choose Basic for surplus 2 over −1. High-demand buyers choose Premium for surplus 4 over 3. Both choose to participate, and the menu separates them.
Play through the model
Set Basic and Premium prices. Each buyer picks whichever option gives them the most surplus, including walking away.
- Low-demand buyer chooses
- Basic
- High-demand buyer chooses
- Premium
Try it
Everyday situations
- A software vendor offers tiers that separate occasional users from heavy users.
- An insurer offers deductible options that attract customers with different expected claims.
- A lender offers contracts that trade collateral for interest.
- A buyer offers suppliers a menu of fixed-price and cost-plus contracts.
- A transit operator offers a pass and individual tickets for riders with different usage.
What changes the result
- A cheaper Premium option can attract both types and eliminate separation.
- A seller can limit features on Basic to make Premium attractive to high-demand buyers.
Practical insight
Check the payoff of each option for each type, including the option to walk away.
Further reading
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Signaling Games
An informed player acts first, and the other uses that action to infer what the player knows or is.