Start with the one-shot incentive
Imagine two suppliers who can both meet a shared quality standard. A supplier that skips inspection saves money today and still benefits from the customer confidence created by its partner. If skipping is privately better regardless of what the other supplier does, a request to cooperate leaves the underlying incentive in place.
Put a value on the next round
Use the atlas’s Prisoner’s Dilemma payoffs. Cooperating each round earns 3. Defecting once earns 5 now, followed by 1 per round if the other player responds by defecting forever. Cooperation becomes sustainable under this response when the discount factor reaches one-half. At the threshold, the future losses exactly offset the immediate gain of 2.
Account for mistakes
A supplier can miss a standard through a deliberate shortcut or a faulty test. A permanent punishment treats those events identically. The Tit for Tat model shows a related failure: one mistaken move can leave two players alternating retaliation. An observable correction process can help participants recover from mistakes.